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ABSTRACT
Proximity tracing apps have been proposed as an aide in dealing
with the COVID-19 crisis. Some of those apps leverage attenua-
tion of Bluetooth beacons from mobile devices to build a record of
proximate encounters between a pair of device owners. The un-
derlying protocols are known to suffer from false positive and re-
identification attacks. We present evidence that the attacker’s diffi-
culty in mounting such attacks has been overestimated. Indeed, an
attacker leveraging a moderately successful app or SDK with Blue-
tooth and location access can eavesdrop and interfere with these
proximity tracing systems at no hardware cost and perform these
attacks against users who do not have this app or SDK installed.
We describe concrete examples of actors who would be in a good
position to execute such attacks. We further present a novel attack,
which we call a biosurveillance attack, which allows the attacker
to monitor the exposure risk of a smartphone user who installs
their app or SDK but who does not use any contact tracing system
and may falsely believe that they have opted out of the system.
Through traffic auditing with an instrumented testbed, we char-
acterize precisely the behaviour of one such SDK that we found
in a handful of apps—but installed on more than one hundred mil-
lion mobile devices. Its behaviour is functionally indistinguishable
from a re-identification or biosurveillance attack and capable of
executing a false positive attack with minimal effort. We also dis-
cuss how easily an attacker could acquire a position conducive to
such attacks, by leveraging the lax logic for granting permissions
to apps in the Android framework: any app with some geoloca-
tion permission could acquire the necessary Bluetooth permission
through an upgrade, without any additional user prompt. Finally
we discuss motives for conducting such attacks.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Security and privacy → Human and societal aspects of se-
curity and privacy; Operating systems security;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Bluetooth-based proximity detection has been rapidly developed
and deployed as a means to fight the public health crisis posed by
COVID-19. The principle is to use mobile phones to digitally as-
sist contagious disease contact tracing by making a digital record
whenever two phones are physically proximate. Bluetooth is po-
tentially suitable for this purpose because it is, in general, used
for short-range radio communication. This is used to detect and
record a proximate encounter which can be used to indicate a risk
for disease exposure for one party to an encounter if the other
party is later labelled as testing positive. Privacy is an immediate
concern. Some protocols, including the widely deployed Google
andApple collaborationGoogle-Apple ExposureNotification (GAEN) [1,
2], promote themselves as being safe for users’ privacy.
The technical mechanism of Bluetooth-based proximity tracing
is that users voluntarily broadcast a frequently changing pseudo-
random identifier, known as an ephemeral id (EphId). These EphIds
are intended to be unlinkably anonymous, so that when a broad-
caster begins to broadcast a new one, receivers are unable to as-
sociate the new broadcast with old broadcasts. In typical imple-
mentations, broadcasts are linkable to the same broadcaster with a
knowledge of a trapdoor function, such as the master key used to
derive them or a central authority who prescribes them. This trap-
door function is used to identify broadcasted EphIds that should
be considered as high risk for exposure, and can be shared so as to
make linkable the otherwise unlinkable identifiers.
Broadly speaking, there are two types of contact tracing sys-
tems: centralized and decentralized. While not the only possible
implementation, centralized system involves a central authority
that maintains the trapdoor functions for all users and can further
associate it with an identifier such as a phone number to be able to
notify them if they are at risk. This means that users’ broadcasted
EphIds are verinymous to this authority, but unlinkably anony-
mous to others. Decentralized systems involve no central author-
ity that knows verinyms and trapdoor functions, but instead users
choose to publish their trapdoor function so that other users may
derive their EphIds and determine if they have an exposure. That is,
all users begin unlinkably anonymous, though some may choose
to become linkably anonymous so as to publish the fact that par-
ticular EphIds should be considered as a risk for exposure.
Decentralized systems appear better for privacy. Unfortunately,
there are two known attacks that have significant implications for
the decentralized scheme, and we introduce a novel third one here.
Note that the first two, known as false-positive attacks and de-
anonymization attacks also exist for the centralized scheme, though
their effectiveness and ease are reduced; we reserve a discussion
for that in Section 5. The third attack we name biosurveillance at-
tack, and it affects a non-user of a decentralized system whose de-
vice has been compromised.
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All these attacks work because Bluetooth beacon broadcasts are
by nature public broadcasts. Anyone else listening to broadcasted
EphIds can store information about it, such as their current loca-
tion; they can also rebroadcast it elsewhere with the goal of cre-
ating false contact events in other users that may result in false
positives. Proponents of decentralized systems dismiss the attacks
as difficult to do and requiring specialized hardware [3], and sug-
gest that the legal system can mitigate their risk [4].
In this work we show that this is not the case: it is easy to per-
form these attacks. Instead of requiring specialized hardware and
physical presence to mount the attack, we show that it can be done
simply by placing an SDK in a popular app. This can be by creating
the app, by purchasing control over a popular app, or by paying a
developer to include the SDK. Observe that this last option is stan-
dard practice in the mobile ecosystem [5]. We further found and
analyze the behaviour of an SDK that already exists on hundreds of
millions of Android phones and which is uploading full Bluetooth
scans of nearby devices including MAC addresses as well as some
Bluetooth advertising data to their central servers.
While we have no evidence of attacks against proximity tracing
being conducted, the company that produced this SDK can triv-
ially mount false-positive, de-anonymization, or biosurveillance
attacks. It further gives evidence that the attacks incur little cost
because a for-profit business is monetizing this data before a novel
health-related purpose was added to it. That is, this type of data
is already being collected in an ecosystem of surveillance capital-
ism [6]. This attack vector requires neither special equipment nor
a physical presence in victim country. The potential adversary re-
quires no specific abilities, powers, or access other than sufficient
budget to write a few lines of code and get it included in a few
modestly popular apps or one superstar app. This is well within
the budget of a state-level adversary.
The contributions of this work are the following:
• We present a new attack, called a biosurveillance attack.
• We show that implementing false positive, de-anonymization
and biosurveillance attacks is trivial at scale by using com-
modity hardware and recruiting smartphone users as con-
fused deputies in the attack.
• We show that there exist apps installed by hundreds of
millions of users that already contain an SDK that imple-
ments a substantial amount of the biosurveillance and de-
anonymization attacks.
• We discuss how false-positive and de-anonymization at-
tacks also affect centralized proximity tracing systems.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we discuss background information including proximity tracing
and the Android permissions system. In Section 3 we describe
our proposed SDK-based attacks. In Section 4 we detail network
transmissions from an SDK that is already deployed and collect-
ing observed Bluetooth traffic. In Section 5 we discuss our results,
including possible mitigations, similar attacks against centralized
systems, and possible attackers and motivations. In Section 6 we
provide future work and Section 7 draw conclusions.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 Nymity Slider
Goldberg’s “nymity slider” [7] is a way of thinking about user pri-
vacy that is relevant for this work. The nymity slider has four
positions: unlinkably anonymous, linkably anonymous, pseudony-
mous, and verinymous. If a user is unlinkably anonymous, it means
that each “message” that they send cannot be linked to any other
message they send. If a user is linkably anonymous, it means that
each message they send can be linked to other messages, but these
messages do not identify the user themselves. If a user is pseudony-
mous, then each message they send can be linked to some assumed
identity of the user’s choice, but this identity does not itself identify
the user and can be dropped at any time. If a user is verinymous,
then every message they send is linked to the user’s true name.
Verinymous does not need to represent the user’s actual name but
can instead by any type of persistent identifier, such as a MAC ad-
dress, which users cannot easily discard.
Users may exist at different positions on the slider, and they
lose anonymity as they go from unlinkably anonymous towards
verinymous. This can happen by design, such as users intention-
ally revealing their identity. It can also happen as a result of a
de-anonymization attack, wherein an attacker uses information to
move some user on the nymity slider towards verinymous against
the design of the system, i.e., in violation of the system’s privacy
claims. For example, a de-anonymization attack could work by at-
taching a verinym to some linked identifiers; it could also simply
link identifiers that were not supposed to be linked.
Users may simultaneously exist at different positions relative
to different entities. For example, a user may be verinymous to
a trusted third party, as well as to themselves, but be unlinkably
anonymous to all others. Thus, a user’s nymity is relative to an-
other entity and can change with time, but only towards veriny-
mous.
2.2 Smartphone Proximity Tracing
Contact tracing in the context of infectious diseases is the practice
of identifying who may be at risk of contagion by referencing the
contacts that an infectious person has recently made. It works by
identifying thosewhomay have been exposed based on earlier con-
tact with a diagnosed individual, and then warning those whomay
be at risk. This was typically a manual process based on personal
recollection, and typically can identify friends, family, coworkers,
etc.
Recollection-based contact tracing, however, is unable to iden-
tify strangers who may have unintentionally come into close con-
tact with an infected individual, e.g., by sharing public transit. For
this reason, many jurisdictions are attempting to use smartphones
as an electronic aid to augment their capacity to conduct contact
tracing. Smartphones assist in two complementary ways: (i) to in-
fer a proximate encounter between two phones, and (ii) to record
the details of this encounter for later contact tracing. This is ap-
pealing in places where a large segment of the population already
carry such devices because it reduces the deployment cost. In a
sense, this paper describes how an attacker can similarly reduce
deployment costs by exploiting smartphones, this time as attack
vectors.
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Bluetooth-Based Proximity. Bluetooth has been used to detect
and infer proximity events. Bluetooth is a commonly used technol-
ogy for short-range wireless communication for many consumer
electronics, such as headphones or game controllers. The observa-
tion is that Bluetooth radio can be used as a “proximity sensor” if
two phones are able to “hear” each other as they broadcast. Deploy-
ments of this involve phones periodically broadcasting a short ran-
dom “ephemeral ID” (EphId) that serves to identify the encounter.
Any EphIds that are “heard” are recorded, i.e. by saving the EphIds
to the device’s storage.
This broadcasting is done with Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) ad-
vertisements. These are also called beacons or advertising bea-
cons, and already serve other purposes in the world. For exam-
ple, they are used for location sensing and can be used to trigger
location-based functionality. They can also convey information,
such as Google’s Eddystone URL beacons that broadcast a hyper-
link, or Apple’s iBeacons, which broadcast device identifiers. The
Google-Apple Exposure Notification (GAEN), which implements
Bluetooth-based proximity for proximity tracing, uses a new type
of advertising beacon to transmit EphIds with the same existing
technology.
Proximity Tracing. With a Bluetooth sensor, users’ smartphones
are able to record all observed EphIds, which corresponds to spe-
cific encounters with others they have had. Proximity tracing is
then implemented by a separate mechanism that identifies partic-
ular EphIds that should be considered as at-risk for infection, be-
cause that EphId was broadcasted at a time the person was con-
tagious and the attenuation of Bluetooth signal strength indicates
proximity. We refer to this as proximity tracing. For example, if a
user tests positive for the disease, they can publish all their broad-
casted EphIDs over their infectiosity window and other users can
determine if they are at risk.
EphIds can be implemented in different ways but existing de-
ployments involve a trapdoor function that is able to link them.
That is, the EphIds broadcasted by the same user are unlinkable
unless one is aware of a trapdoor function that links them. For
example, the EphIds can be the output of a cryptographically suit-
able pseudorandom number generator: with knowledge of the ran-
dom seed, the entire sequence can then be deterministically recon-
structed and therefore any two identifiers linked. The need for link-
ability through the trapdoor function derives in the Google/Apple
implementation from bandwidth considerations.
Centralized and Decentralized Systems. A prominent dimension
in proximity-based contact tracing is the characterization of them
being either centralized or decentralized. While there is diversity
in the specific implementations, the fundamental difference involves
who is aware of the trapdoor function and whether any form of
anonymity is provided.
Centralized systems involve some entity, such as a government
authority, who maintains a mapping from an individual to their
trapdoor function, and informs the individual what to broadcast
and when. If an individual becomes ill, they report all their re-
ceived EphIds to the central entity. The central entity uses the
trapdoor function to de-anonymize these reported EphIds so as to
notify other potentially at-risk individuals.
Decentralized systems, in contrast, involve individuals main-
taining their own trapdoor function, thereby choosing what to
broadcast and when. If they become ill, they may choose to publish
their trapdoor function through a centralized authority. These are
broadcasted to other individuals, who can then generate all EphIds
that would have been sent to determine if they were witness to any.
Note that the design of a decentralized system prevents linking the
trapdoor function to some verinym that identifiers the user.
A fundamental difference between these systems is information
self-determinism. In decentralized systems, individuals—through
their devices—choose their trapdoor and choose whether to publish
it. Another difference is the degree of nymity: in centralized sys-
tems all individuals are verinymous to the central entity; in de-
centralized systems individuals are unlinkably anonymous unless
they choose to become linkably anonymous—for example, to pub-
lish their trapdoor function if they become ill. That is, a central-
ized system has a central entity that learns a verinym for every
encounter that an ill person has had in recent time, even for those
who are not themselves ill, and the central authority may choose
to inform at risk users. In contrast, in a decentralized system ev-
eryone learns how to link identifiers for those who report that they
are ill.
We use the Alberta TraceTogether app [8] as an example of a
centralized system, which we have reversed engineered. Users
register with a phone number and receive an access code. This
access code is then registered with a device identifier to identify
the installation and the user. A central server then provides users
with the list of random identifiers to be used as EphIds, along with
the time interval to use them. The authority maintains a mapping
from a user’s identifier (e.g., a phone number) to the trapdoor func-
tion that allows it to generate and recognize the random identifiers.
Users who become sick are instructed to upload their observed
identifiers to the authority. The authority can then de-anonymize
everyone who may be at risk, and notify them, e.g., by text mes-
sage.
We use the SwissCovid app based on the Google-Apple Expo-
sure Notification as an example of a decentralized system. Here
every user picks their own trapdoor function to derive random
identifiers. If they become sick, they can cooperate with a public
health authority who then publishes their trapdoor function. All
other users then learn the trapdoor and recompute all EphIds that
are now considered to correspond to possible encounters with a
contagious person. They do not reveal to anyone whether they
have in fact witnessed this encounter, but instead check offline—
i.e., only by looking at their own stored data—whether any EphIds
associated with a risk for contagion exist among their collection of
encounters.
Privacy Risks. The privacy intrusions for centralized systems
are clear. First, all users are verinymous to the central authority.
Second, ill users upload all their encounters, which verinymously
identifies both parties to the encounter to the central authority.
This revelation occurs even if one of the parties is not actually ill,
or, in some systems, even if the encounter was considered “at risk”
[9]. Thus, the decision to reveal the fact whether a user was proxi-
mate to someone else is not under the user’s control once they have
broadcasted their EphIds. Additionally, users lack control over the
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data: it is the authority’s decision as to whether to alert users, in-
stead of users being able to assess their own risks based on, for
example, a heightened concern by being more vulnerable or near
those who are, as well as lifestyle factors such as always wearing
a mask when out of doors.
As such, the decentralized system is superficially a better so-
lution for privacy. Users are empowered to assess their own risk
based on information they collect. Only they learn about encoun-
ters they have with others. No entity knows their trapdoor func-
tion except the user unless they intentionally share it with oth-
ers. There is no mapping from actual personal information to the
trapdoor or broadcasted beacons aside from the user. In this work,
however, we show that the privacy implications can be worse in
some decentralized systems, where users who publish their trap-
door function can be made verinymous and have their geolocation
tracked by an adversary with a modest budget.
2.3 Smartphone Permissions
The Android platform uses a permission system to protect access
to sensitive resources based on the security principle of least priv-
ilege. Apps must request relevant permissions in order to be able
to perform specific functionality. Permissions are requested stati-
cally in a “manifest” file and can thus be audited when the app is
installed.
An important distinction among Android permissions are those
classified as dangerous. These include access to sensors such as the
camera and GPS, access to user data such as call logs, and access to
actions such as sending text messages [10]. These are permissions
that Android believes are dangerous if misused by apps and users
are given stronger controls over them. For example, on Android
6.0 and later, users are asked the first time these permissions are
used, and importantly have the ability to deny access to the app.
Conversely, so-called normal permissions get granted upon instal-
lation of the app, or silently added if the app upgrades after the
developer has expanded their manifest file.
Crucially, the permissions that an app has access to are also
granted to any other code that runs as part of that app. This in-
cludes the prolific ads and analytics networks that are often in-
cluded for monetization of apps. These can report back user data
to servers and offer other features to developers. The use of such
third-party code is common—it is easier and generally better to
make use of existing reusable code than to rewrite everything ad
hoc. Nevertheless, it means that some third-party code can find
itself embedded in an app that has requested the right set of per-
missions to perform its desired behaviour.
For Bluetooth, there are two relevant permissions: bluetooth
and bluetooth_admin. The former allows the use of Bluetooth
devices, while the latter permits scanning for and connecting to
new Bluetooth devices, as well as receiving and broadcasting BLE
advertisings. As such, the latter is the permission of interest for
proximity tracing apps and attacks against them. Examples of well-
knownAndroid apps benefiting from bluetooth and bluetooth_admin
permissions would include Spotify or Uber. Despite the signifi-
cance of having administrative power over Bluetooth on a device,
Android considers both Bluetooth permissions “normal”.
Bluetooth has a further toggle in the system status bar. Users
can disable the Bluetooth radio, as well as other radios and features
on the device. For scanning to work, the Bluetooth radio must
be on. Note that any use of Bluetooth, such as for headphones
or car audio, requires that Bluetooth is enabled and thus passive
scanning is possible for other apps. It remains enabled when not in
use unless users diligently disable it when finish using a Bluetooth
device.
Since Android 6.0, apps are required to hold a location permis-
sion in order to scan for nearby Bluetooth devices and nearbyWiFi
routers. This is because the serial numbers for these devices can
act as a surrogate for location [11]. As such, collecting them is
now considered to imply the collecting of location as well. The lo-
cation permission is considered a “dangerous” permission. Users
are prompted before allowing it the first time and can revoke it
through a sequence of settings options. If an update to an app
adds location access, then users are alerted to this fact before it is
used.
In summary, any Android app can acquire the permissions nec-
essary for conducting the attacks we describe here without any
mention of Bluetooth in a user prompt. At best, the user will be
prompted to add some location permission if the app does not al-
ready have that one, but would manage to invisibly slip in neces-
sary Bluetooth permissions at the same time.
3 PROPOSED ATTACK
There are three attackswe consider: false-positive, de-anonymization
and biosurveillance attacks. All these attacks are performed by
an adversary who is capable of running code on millions of field-
deployed smartphones. For example, the attack could be performed
by an SDK that an app maker includes for monetization purposes,
which is a standard practice. The key observation is that the at-
tack can be mounted without specialized equipment and without
a legal presence in the country being attacked. The attacker does
not need to own the phones themselves, but can just leverage the
existing ecosystem of mobile app monetization, where app makers
are paid to include ads and analytics SDKs that run arbitrary code
on users devices.
We call this SDK the attack SDK and assume that it is provided
by the attacker and included in a popular smartphone app or a
bevy of less popular ones. The attack SDK collects and transmits
Bluetooth data and reports all received data back to the attacker. It
also allows the device to broadcast arbitrary Bluetooth low energy
advertisements. The attack SDK results in end users who install an
app containing this SDK to act as confused deputies: they unknow-
ingly undermine the integrity or anonymity of the contract-tracing
system by contributing access to their hardware to the attacker.
Note that there is no technical obstacle to creating such an SDK:
all of the functionality exists in the Android API. In the next sec-
tion we show the existence of an SDK—already deployed on hun-
dreds of millions of devices—that collects and reports back Blue-
tooth low energy advertising data that are “heard”. We do this not
because we believe that this SDK is mounting these attacks, but
rather to provide evidence that these attacks cannot be optimisti-
cally dismissed as hypothetical or unrealistic; they are well within
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the budget of many types of adversaries. For the rest of this sec-
tion, we assume that such an SDK exists and describe how to use
it to mount false-positive, de-anonymization, and biosurveillance
attacks.
3.1 False-Positive Attack
A false-positive attack works by compromising the integrity of
the system by creating false contact events among users. The pre-
sumed goal is to create false positives in risk notifications and so
the attacker’s goal is met if the fake contact events they generated
later correspond to positive diagnoses, since this will trigger a noti-
fication. The implementation of the attack is to rebroadcast EphIds
heard in one location somewhere else, in effect, a relay attack [3].
For example, the attacker may harvest beacons from a site likely
to contain COVID-19 cases, such as a COVID-19 testing facility or
a hospital, and relay them anywhere that the attacker wishes to
cause a fake outbreak, such as at a factory for an economically vi-
tal industry, or during advanced voting to force election officials
to self-quarantine and discourage citizens from voting.
In this case, the attack SDK is configured to harvest all observed
Bluetooth beacons, including the EphIds. These are then uploaded
to a central server as soon as they are available. The attack SDK
is likely to get the user’s location: it is either running on a version
of Android since 2015 that requires location permission to scan
for Bluetooth, or it is not and can use surrogates to GPS-based
location such as cell-phone tower triangulation or router-MAC-
address-based location. Note that these surrogateswork even when
GPS is disabled or unavailable, and in the context of our attacks are
of sufficient granularity to identify actionable location information,
such as “at a hospital”.
Based on geolocation, the attacker then decides which beacons
should be relayed by having other smartphone users running the
attack SDK begin broadcasting them. These users are given the
beacons to broadcast and they simply start advertising. This can
be done by having the attacker SDK contact a control server with
their location, and depending on the attacker’s goal, be given some
EphIds to begin broadcasting along with a time to broadcast them.
Note that EphIds have a short range of time where they can be
relayed. This is by design of the system to both prevent tracking
of users and limit the effectiveness of a relay attack. The Alberta
TraceTogether app uses a period of 15 minutes before switching
EphIds. The SwissCovid app rotates EphIds every 10 minutes, but
theGAEN framework accepts them as valid within a two-hourwin-
dow. The length of the window does not change the feasibility of
the relay attack, even if it is only a minute. The attacker does not
need to be physically present at either the collection site or the re-
lay site. Collected EphIds can be quickly telecommunicated from
the mobile phones that first received them to a central server and
onward to the devices that will rebroadcast them using the Internet.
Shortening the window of time simply means that this collection
and communication occurs more often.
3.2 De-anonymization Attack
A de-anonymization attackworks by having an attacker gain infor-
mation that is not meant to be learned by them. In our case, it refers
to users “losing” positions on the nymity slider for EphIds relative
to an adversary. EphIds are intended to be unlinkably anonymous,
but can become linkably anonymous if users publish their trap-
door. In GAEN, this occurs by design when a user tests positive for
COVID-19 so as to inform all other users of the EphIds that corre-
spond to encounters with a risk for exposure. A de-anonymization
attack is anything an adversary can do to push the nymity slider
towards verinymous, against the user’s interest.
Our proposed attack involves SDKs linking broadcasted EphIds
data to other available information, such as MAC address, GPS lo-
cation, and persistent identifiers. For example, the SDK can cen-
trally store all received EphIds alongwith the precise locationwhere
they were received. Note that these geotagged EphIds are collected
by other devices, i.e., not the one emitting it.
If a user chooses to publish their trapdoor, they then allow any
entity to link their emitted EphIds. Any of these EphIds that have
been collected and geotagged by other nearby devices are then not
only linked but further geotagged, resulting in a location history
for a user who did not have the attack SDK installed on their device.
This can include information about their routine such as where
they sleep, work, and relax, and thus reveals a great deal about
users. This occurs even if the victim user does not use any apps
that collect location or even turn on their GPS.
Additionally, the EphIds are not broadcast in isolation but in-
stead alongside the device’s BluetoothMAC address. The key prob-
lem is to associate private data, such as a number that later is used
to signal a health status, with something that never meant to be
secured, such as a MAC address. Indeed, Google and Apple rec-
ognize this: they now randomize (see Bluetooth specification in
[1, 2]) the broadcasted BluetoothMAC address in tandem with the
changing EphId, so that neither one can be used to bridge changes
in the other. They also prevent programmatic access to the Blue-
tooth MAC address [12]: apps, and thus embedded SDKs, cannot
determine the user’s MAC address. Despite that, the current MAC
address is still broadcasted, and so privacy relies on the privacy of
a value being unknown to the entity that is the one actually broad-
casting it to everyone else. We describe some attacks related to this
in the discussion section.
3.3 Biosurveillance Attack
This attack is novel, and in fact quite simple. It can be conducted
independently of a de-anonymization attack, and concentrates on
inferring the health status of the owner of a particular device. The
victim need not use any contact tracing app and even have aGAEN-
aware mobile device. This means that the user may believe that
they have entirely opted out of participating in proximity tracing.
Despite that, an attack SDK running on such a device can sim-
ply behave like the passive “listening” component of the contact-
tracing system.
The attack SDK collects the observed EphIds that are broad-
casted nearby—the very same ones that collected by a legitimate
contact tracing app. They can use the health authority’s public
information to determine which of these correspond to at-risk en-
counters. This allows the attacker to perform their own risk cal-
culation about the user without the user being aware. Effectively,
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the presence of ambient EphIds creates a new “health” sensor avail-
able to mobile devices in the same way that ambient GPS signals
creates a “location” sensor.
For privacy reasons, the GAEN system introduces limitations
on the data it collects and makes available. Beacons that can read-
ily be deemed to be too distant will be discarded right away. Apps
using the framework will only be able to do coarse computations
on beacon characteristics, and only for those beacons that are de-
clared infected. Users will only see the end results.
On the other hand, the attack SDK is not bound by such con-
siderations. It can observe distant and fleeting beacons as well as
those never deemed infected. It can further collect the time and
place for these encounters.
This provides the SDK with a better view of the ambient traffic
and the prevalence of the GAEN system than the GAEN system it-
self. This also allows for population-level epidemiological research,
such as outbreak detection.
3.4 Features of the Attacks
All these attacks can be done by an attacker with no relation, legal
or otherwise, with the country in which the attack is mounted.
Neither the attack SDK nor the app that includes it need to have
any connection with the affected country for the attack to work.
It is only the end users who unknowingly undermine the system
who are physically present in the affected country.
This is not an exotic attack that requires a high-level of sophis-
tication or domain-specific knowledge. The implementation effort
of scanning and broadcasting Bluetooth signals is greatly reduced
with APIs designed exactly to facilitate this kind of development.
Furthermore, for the false positive and de-anonymization attacks,
there is no need for the victim themselves to be the one who is
also running the attack SDK—it simply needs to have a baseline
presence among other mobile phone users.
4 EXISTING SURVEILLANCE OF BLUETOOTH
In this section we give evidence for the ease that these attacks
could be performed by attackers with modest means. Neither the
relay attack nor the de-anonymization attack are novel to this work;
they are inherent to the design of GAEN. Despite that, we feel
both their feasibility as well as our novel attack is not fully ap-
preciated. For example, the Swiss National Cyber Security Centre,
discussing the GAEN-based SwissCovid app, stated that: “There is
no real safeguard with the current design against this [relay and
de-anonymization] attack vector, however there are only few op-
erators of such systems and they are under the Swiss jurisdiction
which gives at least some protection on the legal level.” [13] This
suggests a belief that the attack needs either leveraging control
over already deployed specialized equipment and a physical pres-
ence to mount the attack, such as a small ground team that collects
data from one location and rebroadcasts it elsewhere. The design
documents of DP-3T [3] also refer to the threat of relay attacks in
the context of high-energy broadcasting and high-gain antennas.
The problem with basing security on an economic argument
is that attacks can become trivial if the economics change or the
cost of all possible implementations of the attack are not consid-
ered. Our SDK-based attack is an example of this: it performs the
same attacks without requiring expensive specialized equipment.
It is mounted entirely with commodity smartphones already de-
ployed; instead of high-gain antennas and high-energy antennas,
the attacker simply usesmany smartphones on the field to receive
and broadcast data. We show the feasibility of this attack by de-
tailing the behaviour of an analytics SDK that is already deployed
and which harvests all Bluetooth broadcast data it observes from
other users. This SDK, which exists as part of the world of surveil-
lance capitalism, can easily perform all three attacks. We detail the
SDK’s behaviour by dynamically analysing two apps that contain
the SDK and recording the network traffic that it generates while
executing.
We first describe our experimental method to test apps and col-
lect data. We then describe a detailed analysis of two apps that
contains the same SDK that harvests available Bluetooth data. We
then list other apps in which we found this SDK and, by doing an
intersection of listed third parties on the apps privacy policies, we
attribute it to the company X-Mode.
4.1 Experimental Methods
We perform our dynamic analysis on a Pixel 3a (sargo) mobile
phone. The phone is running an instrumented version of Android
Pie, which records network traffic for later analysis, including traf-
fic secured by TLS. Our instrumentation attributes network traffic
to the specific app that is responsible for its transmission. It also
logs access to permission-protected resources, such as performing
Bluetooth scans. As such, we are able to observe the real-world
behaviour of an app as it executes.
Our instrumented operating system further injects spuriousBlue-
tooth scan results when an app attempts to scan for nearby de-
vices. We use conspicuous palindromic MAC addresses in our in-
jected results and search for them being transmitted. We format
the Bluetooth advertising data to match standard beacon formats
and ensure that the raw bytes are valid for the format. We in-
ject an iBeacon (MAC address AB:B1:E6:6E:1B:BA), an AltBea-
con (MAC address AB:B1:E7:7E:1B:BA), an Eddystone URL (MAC
address AB:B1:E8:8E:1B:BA), and a GAEN beacon (MAC address
AB:B1:E9:9E:1B:BA).
We start the app and accept its request for permissions, and
then leave the app running with occasional random UI interac-
tions through the Android “monkey” utility. We then obtain the
network traffic and process it with a suite of decoders to remove
standard encodings such as gzip and base64. We remove network
traffic from other apps, such as system ones, and consider only that
traffic being sent by the app under investigation.
4.2 App Collection
We used the following method to collect apps with Bluetooth per-
missions from the Google Play Store. First, we search the play
store using a dictionary of 4842 English adjectives. We collected
the names of apps that appear as the top results when searching
these. This gave us a list of 34952 unique app package names.
We then scraped the permissions requested by each of these
apps. We were able to get this information for 28270 of them. We
then filtered the list to include only apps that requested both the
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bluetooth_admin permission and a location permission, i.e., ei-
ther access_fine_location or access_coarse_location. This
left us with 1358 apps that are permissioned to perform this attack.
These 1358 represent an astounding 4.80% of random Google
Play Store apps sampled by ourmethod, nearly one in twenty. Note
that the newest version of Android, which is only deployed on a
small number of phones, requires strictly access_fine_location,
not access_coarse_location. This has little impact on the preva-
lence of apps able to do this: of the 1358 apps, 1215 apps required
the fine location permission. Recall that bluetooth_admin is not
considered “dangerous”, meaning that apps can update to include
it without alerting the user. Through our methods, we found 7835
apps with a location permission—more than one in four (27.7%).
We then ran each of the apps holding bluetooth_admin and
a location permission on our dynamic analysis testbed based on
prior published methods [14]. We examined apps to see if any
transmitted our spurious Bluetooth MAC addresses. We found a
handful of apps doing exactly this with all of the data going to
one of two domains. We reversed engineered the SDK to confirm
our findings and trace the Bluetooth scanning to network transmis-
sions. We now give example transmissions for two apps containing
this SDK.
4.3 Case Studies on Two Apps
In this sectionwe discuss the findings for two apps, FunDevs LLC’s
Video MP3 Converter (com.fundevs.app.mediaconverter) and Pix-
elProse SARL’s Bubble level (net.androgames.level). The former
app is notable as it has more than one hundred million installations
and more than 600,000 reviews with an average of 4.4 out of 5. The
latter app is less popular (only more than 10 million installations)
but receives different configuration options and also behaves differ-
ently, which is noteworthy in itself. On June 21st, 2020, we down-
loaded and installed the app com.fundevs.app.mediaconverter from
the Google Play Store to our instrumented Pixel 3 mobile phone
and ran it with our dynamic analysis testbed. We collected all its
network traffic while we ran the app and then analysed it after-
wards. We confirmed our findings by repeating this on July 22nd,
2020.
The first contact is to bin5y4muil.execute-api.us-east-1.
amazonaws.com (port 443) where the app performs a GET request
for /prod/sdk-settings and provides an API key as an HTTP
header (x-api-key). It returns a JSON object storing a configura-
tion. This includes a number of parameters for Bluetooth scanning:
• "baseUrlDomain":"api.myendpoint.io"
• "beaconsEnabled":false
• "bleScanMaxPerHour":2
• "btScanMaxPerHour":2
This initial configuration retrieval also occurs for other apps by
other developers that contain X-Mode’s SDK. The actual config-
urations do change, however, and it may depend on the API key
that requests it. Observe the "beaconsEnabled":false flag: for
the Bubble level app this value is set to true and the resulting be-
haviour of the SDK changes. This shows how the attack SDK could
evade detection by selectively engaging in attack behaviours only
when necessary.
There are two domains that receive transmissions of sensor data:
smartechmetrics.com and myendpoint.io. Figures 1–3 show ex-
amples of these transmissions. Both domains receive the results of
a scan of nearby WiFi routers and Bluetooth devices as well as pre-
cise GPS coordinates. The myendpoint.io domain only transmits
precise GPS when beaconsEnabled is set to false; when it is set to
true, it also sends nearby MAC addresses as well as Bluetooth LE
advertising data as well.
Figure 1 presents a transmission to smartechmetrics.com. We
have redacted identifying information, and observe that some of
the transmissions of WiFi routers are devices that are nearby to
our testbed but not actually devices owned by the authors. We see
that the MAC addresses for all injected Bluetooth traffic are col-
lected and transmitted, along with two pieces of consumer Blue-
tooth electronics in the same room as the testbed.
{"multi_part":{},
"obs":[
{"gaid":"<AAID>",
"ids":["google_aid^<AAID>"],
"lat":<LATITUDE>,
"lon":<LONGITUDE>,
"metadata":["device:AOSP on BullHead",
"os_version_int:25",
"sdk_version:1.9.2-bcn",
"app:Video MP3 Converter"],
"observed":[{"mac":"AB:B1:E6:6E:1B:BA","name":"null",
"rssi":-12,"tech":"ble"},
{"mac":"AB:B1:E8:8E:1B:BA","name":"null",
"rssi":-12,"tech":"ble"},
{"mac":"AB:B1:E7:7E:1B:BA","name":"null",
"rssi":-12,"tech":"ble"},
{"mac":"AB:B1:E9:9E:1B:BA","name":"null",
"rssi":-12,"tech":"ble"},
{"mac":"<NEARBY MAC>","name":"null"
"rssi":-50,"tech":"ble"},
{"mac":"<NEARBY MAC>","name":"<NEARBY NAME>",
"rssi":-43,"tech":"bluetooth"},
{"mac":"<NEARBY ROUTER MAC>","name":"<NEARBY SSID>",
"rssi":-50,"tech":"wifi"},
<... 7 more observations ...>],
"timepoint":"1592782636",
"token":"z1+y/FCqZ2ZD8QNldpJasF/te5KBhHqXT0YlT5L/eOw="}]
}
Figure 1: Transmission payload from Video MP3 Converter
to api.smartechmetrics.com:443. Advertising ID, precise
geolocation, and nearby MAC addresses and device names
have been redacted. Whitespace has been added for clarity.
Observed that the first MAC addresses in the observed array
correspond to our spurious traffic.
Figure 2 shows an example WiFi and Bluetooth scan being sent
to api.myendpoint.io by the app net.androgames.level. We
see that in addition to actual wireless devices, all our injected Blue-
tooth devices are included in the transmission. The corresponding
transmission from com.fundevs.app.mediaconverter only sent
location, which appears to be because the command and control
server gave the instruction that beaconsEnabled is set to false
while it was set to true for apps that sent this information.
Figure 3 shows another transmission sent to api.myendpoint.io
by net.androgames.level. This includes not only precise geolo-
cation and a result from a Bluetooth scan but it actually includes
the advertising data of the Bluetooth scan itself. The list of bea-
cons in the JSON transmission has one entry corresponding to the
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[
{
"beaconType": "EDDYSTONE_URL",
"isCharging": false,
"loc_at": 1592412157818,
"mac": "AB:B1:E8:8E:1B:BA",
"name": "",
"rssi": -12,
"scan_record": {},
"tech": "ble",
"time": 1594004410113
},
{
"isCharging": false,
"loc_at": 1592412157818,
"mac": "AB:B1:E7:7E:1B:BA",
"name": "",
"rssi": -12,
"scan_record": {},
"tech": "ble",
"time": 1594004410112
},
{
"beaconType": "IBEACON",
"isCharging": false,
"loc_at": 1592412157818,
"mac": "AB:B1:E6:6E:1B:BA",
"name": "",
"rssi": -12,
"scan_record": {},
"tech": "ble",
"time": 1594004410112
},
{
"isCharging": false,
"loc_at": 1592412157818,
"mac": "XX:XX:XX:XX:XX:XX",
"name": "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX",
"rssi": -53,
"scan_record": {},
"tech": "bluetooth",
"time": 1592412158800
},
{
"isCharging": false,
"loc_at": 1592412157818,
"mac": "XX:XX:XX:XX:XX:XX",
"name": "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX",
"rssi": -54,
"tech": "wifi",
"time": 1592412158401
},
< truncated >
]
Figure 2: Data sent by the app net.androgames.level to the
domain api.myendpoint.io. We addedwhitespace for clarity
and redacted identifiers.
injected iBeacon. The key mumm we believe stands for mac uuid
major minor, because it is in fact an underscore-separated string
of those four fields. We observe that the uuid, major, and minor
values are exactly those that we configured to be sent as the adver-
tised data.
From this case study of one SDK,we understand that it is already
the case today that Bluetooth advertising data is being read, pro-
cessed, and sent to servers on the Internet bymillions of userswhile
they go about their day. Note that Android permits this scanning
to occur in the background, so users do not need to use the apps in
question in order for this to be collected and uploaded. There is no
{
"all_beacon_data": [
{
"accuracy": 20.934XXXXXXXXXXX,
"ad_id": "<AAID>",
"altitude": <ALTITUDE>,
"beacons": [
{
"distance": 0.97085,
"layout_name": "",
"mac_address": "AB:B1:E6:6E:1B:BA",
"major": "53479",
"minor": "42571",
"mumm": "AB:B1:E6:6E:1B:BA_01022022-fa0f-0100-
00ac-dd1c6502da1c_53479_42571",
"rssi": -12,
"uuid": "01022022-fa0f-0100-00ac-dd1c6502da1c"
}
],
"bearing": 0,
"latitude": <LATITUDE>,
"longitude": <LONGITUDE>,
"model": "AOSP on sargo",
"os_version": "9",
"platform": "android",
"sdk_version": "1.9.2-bcn",
"speed": 0,
"time": 1592412157818,
"vert_acc": 2
}
]
}
Figure 3: Data sent by net.androgames.level to
api.myendpoint.io. We redacted sensor data. We added
whitespace for clarity and broke the mumm value over two
lines. Observe that this includes the transmission of the
advertising data from a Bluetooth beacon.
technical limitation that prevents the full collection of the adver-
tised data: a few simple lines of code could make them also upload
the GAEN EphIds. These can be then sent out to other devices
and rebroadcasted, or accumulated to enable de-anonymization
and biosurveillance attacks.
4.4 Prevalence of SDK
Using our testing methods, we have found this SDK in 10 apps
available on the Google Play Store. Table 1 presents the list of
apps that we found, along with the number of installs, number of
reviews, and a list of third parties. The MP3 converter app has
more than 100 million installs; the next three have more than 10
million. They are a battleship game, an app tomeasure if a physical
surface is level, and an Internet-speed testing app.
To determine who is responsible for this SDK, we studied the
privacy policies of all these apps. In particular, wemanually looked
for third parties or trusted partieswithwhom information is shared.
We found only one common entity among them and, it was present
for all of them: X-Mode. One of the apps simply hyperlinked to X-
Mode’s privacy policy as their entire statement about “Collection
and Sharing of User Information” [15].
X-Mode, formerly Drunk-Mode [16], is a data aggregator and
manager. Their privacy policy [17] states that they focus on pre-
cise location data for marketers, advertisers and researchers for
financial and market research, for traffic and city planning, for
educational purposes, but also, since May 17th 2020, for disease
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App Package Installs Reviews Third Parties
Video MP3 Converter com.fundevs.app.mediaconverter 100M+ 600K+ Admob, Smaato, Mobfox, Tutela,
and X-Mode
Fleet Battle - Sea Battle de.smuttlewerk.fleetbattle 10M+ 130K+ X-Mode only
Bubble Level net.androgames.level 10M+ 200K+ nearly one hundred including X-Mode
SPEEDCHECK Internet Speed Test org.speedspot.speedanalytics 10M+ 484K+ nearly forty including X-Mode
Speedcheck org.speedspot.speedspot 1M+ 62K+ Opensignal, Sens360, Tutela, X-Mode,
HUQ, and Ogury
Compass fr.avianey.compass 1M+ 35K+ nearly one hundred including X-Mode
Just a Compass (Free & No Ads) net.androgames.compass 1M+ 21K+ nearly one hundred including X-Mode
Portable ORG Keyboard com.audiosdroid.portableorg 500K+ 1K+ Opensignal and X-Mode
The Sun Ephemeris fr.avianey.ephemeris 50K+ 1K+ nearly one hundred including X-Mode
Altimeter PRO fr.avianey.altimeter 50K+ 1K+ nearly one hundred including X-Mode
Table 1: List of apps that we found that contain the SDK that collects Bluetooth signals, along with number of installations,
number of comments, and third parties listed in the privacy policy.
prevention, security, anti-crime and law enforcement. They col-
lect precise geolocation, duration of time spent in places, as well
as BLE sensors and beacons, IoT signals, data sent over NFC, and
persistent identifiers of users.
To be clear, we have seen no evidence that X-Mode’s SDK is per-
forming any of the false positive, de-anonymization or biosurveil-
lance attacks, and likewise for any of the apps listed in Table 1. Ar-
guably, neither their collection of user data nor broadcasted Blue-
tooth data violate any laws as the behaviours are clearly docu-
mented on their privacy policy and users have no expectation of
privacy for messages they broadcast over public radio.
Our focus on this particular SDK is to show the depth and scale
of the existing state of surveillance capitalism in which proxim-
ity tracing is being added. In particular, that there already exists
a field-deployed Bluetooth signals scanner and aggregator, which
centralizes data from hundreds of millions of mobile devices. The
owners of these hundreds of millions of devices that do the actual
work may be unaware that they are doing this collection on behalf
of X-Mode if they do not carefully read privacy policies. This col-
lection is presumably profitable, as X-Mode is a for-profit company
that sells this information. The consequence is that deploying an
attack SDKmay even pay for itself by also monetizing the data that
is collected, significantly reducing the cost to perform the attacks
described earlier.
5 DISCUSSION
5.1 Coverage Requirement
The epidemiological utility of the GAEN framework roughly scales
with the square α2 of the prevalence rate α of the app within the
population. Since α is a proportion, so below 1, it is crucial these
apps get significant adoption to be of any broad utility for epidemi-
ological purposes. One might naturally anticipate a similarly pro-
hibitive prevalence requirement for the attacking SDK. This is ac-
tually not the case. Indeed, a GAEN app is constrained by design
to require both relevant devices to have the app installed, and will
not do anything as long as neither of the two relevant users is in-
fected. By opposition, an attacker does not have that constraint.
They can eavesdrop and interfere with any communication taking
place between two other devices (and even create new connections
in the case of replay attacks). We have not precisely quantified
the requirements for the attacks described earlier, but previous re-
search for other real-life networks has shown that intrusions on
a network originating in just one node can cause population-level
privacy loss quickly [18], when a node has the capacity to observe
traffic within its neighbourhood.
5.2 Operating System Controls
Mobile phones can prevent access to EphIds by filtering out mes-
sages meant for proximity tracing from the rest of the Bluetooth
scan results and prevent broadcasting over BLE of messages that
could be interpreted as an EphId for any particular proximity trac-
ing system. This limits the attackers ability to perform this attack
because fewer devices can be enlisted to perform the attack. That
is, the data is still being broadcasted publicly, but there are fewer
devices that the adversary can use to collect the data.
Bluetoothpermissions could be restricted. The permission could
be considered dangerous and users given control with run-time
prompts and the ability to restrict Bluetooth for third party apps
while still getting to use Bluetooth headphones. This also pre-
vents apps from updating to silently add administrative control
over Bluetooth.
A further control is to disallow scanning for Bluetooth signals
for apps running in the background. The behaviours we observed
from the SDK occur even if you do not use the app, because the An-
droid allows apps to start silently in the background and perform
Bluetooth scans, as well as communicate to their servers, without
any user engagement with the app. This means that apps that
have been installed and stopped being used can still exhibit this
behaviour. The devices that the attacker can use decreases precip-
itously if users are required to be actually running the app that
contains the attack SDK, instead of just having once ever installed
it.
All these controls should be implemented; unfortunately none
will address the issue. This is because support for security fixes
for mobile phones are shorter than the useful lifespan of a device.
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Older phones can be refurbished and repurposed, and given to peo-
ple who may not be able to afford a state-of-the-art phone every
three years. Privacy updates are not given the same importance as
security updates because they are typically not patched but rather
come with newer versions of the operating system.
According toAndroid’s distribution dashboard [19], data regard-
ing distribution of Android devices can be found using the Android
App making tool Android Studio [20]. When creating an app, one
can specify a targeted version to determine howmany devices will
support that. Using this toolwe found that 11.2% of devices are still
using Android 6.0, a version released first in 2015 and last updated
in 2017. Devices using this version do not receive security updates
and it is officially unsupported. A further 7.4% of devices use ver-
sions of Android even older than 6.0. These numbers are similar
to another source, StatCounter [21], which puts them it at 8.4% for
version 6.0 and 6.4% for earlier.
As long as a baseline of phones in an area run versions of An-
droid with privacy vulnerabilities, an SDK can take advantage of
that fact to perform these attacks. The attacker further needs only
one device in the right place to do the broadcasting. Given the
great diversity in the Android ecosystem, including a variety of
smartphonemanufacturers with customized operating systems, the
ability to entirely disable this functionality is unlikely. This is not
necessarily Google’s fault for decentralizing smartphone usage in-
stead of Apple’s model of centralizing it, but it does mean that mil-
lions of field-deployed Bluetooth sensors are easily at command for
an adversary and are out of reach of security update mechanisms.
This illustrates the difficulty in adding a security or privacy pur-
pose to a feature on a commodity device that was never meant
to have it, versus building systems with security by design. If
broadcasting over Bluetooth and accessing broadcasts from Blue-
tooth were considered dangerous from the original implementa-
tion, there would not be countless legacy devices for which it was
accessible. Similarly, legacy devices may process observed BLE ad-
vertisements in irresponsible ways without realizing that it now is
associated with sensitive health data.
5.3 MAC Address Echo Attacks
Following on this theme is the idea that Bluetooth MAC are now
considered too sensitive to allow apps to access. If the attacker
records EphIds, it can also record the current randomized Blue-
tooth MAC addresses that is broadcasted alongside. Such an ad-
versary needs only to associate one of these MAC addresses to a
persistent identifier belonging to the user, or to know that it came
from a particular phone. There is a certain irony to the fact that
a value ought to remain unknown to the person who is the one
intentionally broadcasting it to everyone else.
This is vulnerable to an echo attack, where an SDK simply re-
peats back everything it hears over Bluetooth, allowing the sender
to learn its identity. The initial broadcast of MAC address and
EphId is done by the proximity tracing app, it is received by a
nearby phone and the attack SDK then echos it back using a dif-
ferent Bluetooth service UUID to separate it from traffic filtered
out for proximity tracing apps only, and then received by the same
attack SDK running on the original phone.
This echo attack allows the SDK to learn the user’s Bluetooth
MAC address and EphIds despite operating system controls that
allow access to this information. This data can then be sent to a
central service along with the user’s advertising ID or other persis-
tent identifiers. This gives them a mapping from verinym to MAC
address from the user, and a mapping from MAC address to EphId
can be made by anyone listening to broadcasts. Such an echo sys-
tem may even occur entirely benignly.
Amore aggressive attackwould broadcast a persistent identifier
instead, which would then be automatically annotated with the
Bluetooth MAC address—the same MAC address being used for
EphIds. The same SDK running on another device can upload this
data to the attacker without echoing. This gives the attacker the
same pairs of mappings to de-anonymize users.
This de-anonymization attack is substantially harder than the
one presented in Section 3 because it requires two phones in close
proximity running the same attack SDK, and only users running
the attack SDK can become victims. It would require nearly 71%
( 1√
2
) of the GAEN-using population to have the attack SDK such
that half of encounters could bemutually de-anonoymized. Privacy-
conscious individuals are likely to not install closed-source apps
that use surveillance capitalism for monetization and thus greatly
reducing their risk. Note, however, that the attack works even if
these two phones encounter each other only once during the pe-
riod of relevance of the trapdoor function. If a user broadcasts
their trapdoor function, the attacker needs only be able to map
one EphId to a verinym through a MAC address in order to make
verinymous all broadcasted EphIds.
5.4 Attacks against Centralized Systems
While we discussed the attacks in the context of decentralized sys-
tems, it is important to note that many of the same risks apply to
centralized systems as well.
Relay Attack. First, the relay attack can still be executed as de-
scribed. Without any additional scrutiny of reported EphIds, false
positives will affect the integrity of the system by misleading the
central authority, who then issues erroneous exposure alerts.
The central authority, however, has additional tools at their dis-
posal because of their high-level view of all reported infections.
For example, collecting identifiers at one site and broadcasting
themwidely across a geographic area may reveal the attack through
manual proximity tracing efforts, i.e. that different individuals were
in different places at the time yet still observed the same beacon.
This increases the cost on operating the system by requiring extra
analysis and scrutiny while having little cost for the attacker, and
can erode trust in the intent of the authorities as individual users
may not perceive the necessity of such monitoring. Moreover, the
attacker can mitigate risk of exposure by only relaying the signals
at one specific target instead of more broadly.
Even if the central server is able to correctly identify all EphIds
involved in relay attacks, this opens up a false negative attack for
centralized systems. Instead of creating fake outbreaks, the at-
tacker relays all EphIds with the goal of getting them ignored by
the central authority. This prevents users from actually receiving
exposure notifications and degrades the utility of the proximity
tracing app.
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A central authority could also encode geographic information
in EphIds. For example, different lists of EphIds could be given
to the user with instructions on which set to use depending on
some rough location, such as which cell phone tower is nearest.
For example, a user may select an EphId from their list such that
the hash of it and a nearby cell tower’s identifier have, say, four
zeros at the start. Receivers will reject EphIds that do not pass this
check, limiting the locations where it can be relayed. This further
adds geolocation information to the data collected by the central
authority.
De-anonymization Attack. The de-anonymization attack, how-
ever, is less effective for centralized systems. The attacker can still
implement an echo attack to link broadcasted EphIds to a persis-
tent identifier. They cannot, however, learn the specific health sta-
tus of that individual because that information is not published.
The attacker is also unable to “query” the database because the
system works by notifying users only when they appear on other
users’ submissions. Some attacks are possible. For example, the
attacker could broadcast an EphId only once to a single victim; if
that victim uploads their data then the attacker may get notified
that they are at risk and know that it could only have come from
the victim.
Another risk is an insider threat. If an attacker had access to the
centralized service mapping EphIds to verinyms, then this infor-
mation may get abused. Such a system also presents a single point
of failure that can have enormously devastating consequences if
it is accessed or published without authorization and erode public
trust in similar future initiatives.
If the central authority abuses their power by using data about
contacts by people for any other purposes than the intended prox-
imity tracing, then a new attack is available: the attacker can try
to frame a user by creating fake contact events. For example, the
attacker collects EphIds from their target, and broadcasts it else-
wherewith the goal of having other users report this fake encounter
to the central authority when uploading all their encounter data.
This may have consequences depending on how this data is abused
by the government. For example, the encounter may represent
the user in violation of a bail condition, in violation of a lock-
down requirement, or simply present at an event that a politically-
restrictive government has banned.
Biosurveillance Attacks. By design, centralized systems do not
distribute any of the health status data necessary for the risk cal-
culation. Therefore biosurveillance attacks are not possible as de-
scribed here, unless the SDK learns of infected persons through
other means.
5.5 App Stores and App Permissions
Apple and Google both have tremendous powers acting as gate
keepers for their respective mobile app marketplaces. Google is
frequently criticized, particularly in academic work, but it is worth
noting that Apple’s lack of criticism reflects its status as a closed
society. Open societies, like democracies, invite criticism and pro-
vide transparency. Android’s open source operating system and
computer control over mobile devices permits automated analysis
of app at scale that results in them being criticized precisely be-
cause it is comparatively easy to do so. Anyone with an Android
device can audit its security and perform large-scale analysis.
Apple, in contrast, offer a limited number of “positions” in a re-
search device program subject to a legal contract withApple, an ap-
plication review, and only for those who are membership account
holders in the Apple Developer Program and have “a proven track
record of success in finding security issues on Apple platforms, or
other modern operating systems and platforms” [22]. The device
remains Apple’s property and participants are required to report
findings about Apple products to Apple. They stress that not all
qualified applicants will be accepted due to the decision to limit
manufacturing of devices that facilitate scrutiny.
Both can make many improvement on how apps are recom-
mended to users. Apps with invasive permission requirements
should not be as highly recommended as similar appswithout them.
Basic static analysis can detect if permission use is likely necessary
only for third-party libraries. Users should be able to search for
apps by specifying permissions they are unwilling to grant. Find-
ing open-source apps that do not serve ads, collect user data, or
even use the Internet, should be made much easier. Internet usage
should also be considered “dangerous”, so users cannot be misled
that an app that uses all their sensors is safe because—for now—it
does not report it. Users should also be afforded mechanisms to
deny Internet access to apps that have no legitimate need for it,
even if that means only open-source apps remain as interfaces for
basic sensors such as flashlight and compass.
As noted, nearly five percent of a random sample of Google Play
Store apps had both access to a user’s location and administra-
tive control over Bluetooth. We leave a deeper scrutiny of this
as future work, but to give some perspective we would still like
to give now a random sample of ten apps from our list of apps
pulled from the Play Store (sample obtained by running the shuf
command followed by head -n 10 on the whole set). In the sam-
ple are a carwash reward loyalty app; a cafe app for a particular
cafe in the Detroit community, an app for an arts and craft store,
a piano metronome (whose privacy policy makes no mention of
Bluetooth and for which there is no associated hardware), an app
for an awards ceremony, and a few games. The single app with
obvious need to scan for Bluetooth was the “Happn” app, which
uses Bluetooth-based proximity tracing to recommend people to
date with whom you keep crossing paths. Control over the ad-
ministration of Bluetooth devices should be reserved for a small
number of apps that need that privilege; not compass and bubble
level apps that happen to harvest this information without utility
to their stated purpose. Indeed, it is exactly this type of abuse that
a least-privilege-based permission system is meant to thwart.
Google should consider both Bluetooth permissions dangerous
so that apps cannot add themwithout user warning, and that users
can granularity disable access to Bluetooth on a per-app basis. The
global toggle for Bluetooth is insufficient as some users may have a
Bluetoothperipheral that they require using. Apps with associated
hardware should have the ability to engage in user-aided pairing
through operating system intents rather than requiring administra-
tive control and thereby granting that privilege to any embedded
SDK that comes with it.
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5.6 Potential Adversaries and Motives
Our adversarial model has two weak assumptions: (i) they can
write code or pay someone to write it, and (ii) they created a popu-
lar app, can purchase control of it, or can incentivize an app maker
to include their SDK for monetization purposes. There are no tech-
nical limitations or powers that the adversary needs to mount this
attack; they do not need to compromise any systems; having a bud-
get is sufficient. The software they need towrite is straightforward,
with all the APIs and frameworks to implement the attack readily
available. The false positive attack is the only attack described here
that requires active interference with the system and has the poten-
tial to be detected and classified as malware; the other two attacks
can be implemented offline by analysing data that is already being
collected.
The existence of a vulnerability, however, does not imply an at-
tack: we require amotivated attacker. To better assess the risks and
thus the threat of this attack, we consider all the adversary types
from Van Oorschot’s categorical schema [23]. It divides adver-
saries into foreign intelligence, politically-motivated adversaries
and cyber terrorists, industrial espionage agents, organized crim-
inals, lesser criminals, malicious insiders, and non-malicious em-
ployees. We do not see specific threats for the last two categories,
but for the remaining ones it is clear that false positive attacks to
shut down particular industries are within the motives for these
attackers, whether for profit, ideology, or notoriety.
Foreign Intelligence. This adversary ismotivated by allegiance to
a nation and unconcerned about the law in the country where they
mount their attack. They may be concerned about their domestic
law but may further receive cover for their actions. They have the
budget that their country deems necessary to mount their attack.
We have already seen state-sponsored disinformation campaigns
regarding election interference [24]. Opportunities to selectively
suppress or shutdown particular groups comes readily to the imag-
ination: political rallies, demonstrations, voters in a particular area,
the postal system during an election, military sites, and industries
supporting the military.
Note that in the context of disinformation, the mere existence
of a technical vulnerability can have disruptive potential in itself,
as an adversary might merely hint at its knowledge of the weak-
ness in order to erode trust. This effect is accrued for decentralized
systems, as it would be harder to determine whether an attack has
even taken place, which can in turn compound confusion as some
would start arguing whether the attacks was triggered, with little
evidence to anchor the discussion.
Cyber Terrorists or Politically-motivated Adversaries. This adver-
sary is motivated by allegiance to a cause and may or may not
be concerned about the law. Of those willing to mount an attack,
they may further lack a budget. Nevertheless, they may be able
to recruit others who share the same allegiance to a cause to pro-
vide the skill required. For example, one member of an organiza-
tion may create the popular app that later becomes weaponized by
another member without the first ever intending to weaponize it
themselves.
Examples for politically motivated reasons to suppress a partic-
ular population include much from the foreign intelligence cate-
gory as it relates to election interference. It also includes motives
to support causes, such as disrupting the operations of slaughter-
houses by those against the consumption of meat, and disruption
the operations of oil refineries by those against the production of
greenhouse gas emissions.
Industrial EspionageAgents. This adversary ismotivated by profit
and is concerned about the law. There would be no national cover
or protection for their actions, though they may exist in less legally
stringent nations and conduct their attacks on either foreign-owned
companies or on industries in foreign nations. Any large organiza-
tion will have sufficient budget to mount such an attack.
For those adversaries who face no legal repercussions the ben-
efit of creating a false outbreak at a rival work site is that they
benefit financially by continuing their own operations, and possi-
bly reputationally depending on the specific nature of the industry,
particularly if an outbreak poses a health risk to end consumers.
Organized Crime. This adversary is motivated by profit and un-
concerned about the law. They have sufficient budget to mount
the attack so long as the attack itself is more profitable than the
cost. While they cannot write code or are unwilling to do it with-
out remuneration, they have sufficient budget to have it made.
For these adversaries any effort in a profitable endeavour is suf-
ficient motivation. Advanced knowledge of any sort of economic
disruption is sufficient to perform criminal insider trading, hoard-
ing then gouging, and extorting against the threat of an outbreak.
Lesser Criminals and Crackers. This adversary is motivated by
notoriety or curiosity and may or may not be concerned about the
law. For example, they may be a black-hat juvenile insufficiently
mature to appreciate the actual consequences. This adversary is
likely to lack a budget, but will have both time and skill. Were
they able to create a popular app they would be able to mount
the attack, and perhaps use it to create a number of fake outbreak
hotspots that prints some message on a map.
6 FUTURE WORK
There is future work for this topic. Apps using Bluetooth need
more careful scrutiny and auditing. SDKs that collect Bluetooth
information need particular scrutiny. Our methods identified X-
Mode because they did not use any obfuscation in sending their
data, but many SDKs do use various types of obfuscations. We
must examine whenever any app or SDK perform a Bluetooth scan
and examine all the network traffic to scrutinize other SDKs that
exhibit the same behaviour while obfuscating their transmissions.
Additionally, the use of BLE broadcasts can be audited more pre-
cisely. This work simply injected faked observed results, but we
did not investigate whether any app or SDK actually generated
their own broadcasts. The broadcasting done over BLE must be
collected and analyzed. In particular, if our fake scan results are
ever later broadcasted we can investigate whether it is attempting
to infer MAC addresses through an echo attack.
Now that proximity tracing apps aremorewidely deployed, apps
with Bluetoothpermissions can be retested to see if their behaviours
are changing. Apps that update to now include bluetooth_admin
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when before they did not should be retested as well to understand
the purpose of the change. Furthermore, we did our testing in Al-
berta, Canada, which is a jurisdiction that does not have a decen-
tralized proximity tracing system. Testing of apps in a jurisdic-
tion may reveal different behaviours, particularly given how the
command and control configuration impacts X-Mode’s SDK’s be-
haviour.
7 CONCLUSION
In this work, we argued that Bluetooth-based proximity tracing
apps are fundamentally insecure with respect to an attacker lever-
aging a malevolent app or SDK. We showed that it is easier than
anticipated for an attacker to gain that capability, and that once
there they could launch de-anonymization, false positive or bio-
surveillance attacks. While there are obvious public health benefits
to proximity tracing apps for the purpose of fighting the COVID-
19 pandemic which put privacy concerns to the backseat in this
context, our work cautions that the existence of an ecosystem of
surveillance capitalism should not be dismissed, as it is an unfortu-
nate attack vector that threatens the security and privacy of both
centralized and decentralized proximity tracing systems.
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